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NOTES
into evidence, the court assumed that the statement was not ad-
missible in order to find that, even if it had been improperly in-
troduced, it had been harmless error. This hesitancy, however, was
overborne in State v. Castillo." The Castillo court, with no reluc-
tance, cited Innis and approved the admission of defendant's in-
criminating statement into evidence.
It is submitted that the majority's definition of "interrogation"
in Rhode Island v. Innis leaves too many questions unanswered. The
reader is left without knowing what "subtle compulsion" is or how
and when it may be used. He is left confused concerning the rationale
behind the fifth and sixth amendment dichotomy; it is unclear why two
distinct tests are applied to essentially similar factual situations. No
guidance is provided in the opinion as to what words or actions will
meet the Innis test of "interrogation." This writer suggests that the
dictates, reasoning, and purposes of Miranda would be served more ef-
fectively by adoption of the definition of interrogation offered by
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion: "In my view any statement
that would normally be understood by the average listener as calling
for a response is the functional equivalent of a direct question, whether
or not it is punctuated by a question mark."8 By focusing on the
perceptions of the "average listener," Justice Stevens' definition
makes a "reasonable man" of the trier of fact, rather than requiring
that he determine what a reasonable policeman should know. Applying
this test to the instant case, one perhaps would reach a different
result from that reached by the majority, a result more consistent
with the dictates of Miranda.
George W. Pugh, Jr.
LOUISIANA'S ALIMONY PROVISIONS:
A MOVE TOWARD SEXUAL EQUALITY
In a divorce proceeding the trial court ordered the husband to
pay alimony to his wife. He appealed, contending that Civil Code ar-
ticle 148, the basis for alimony pendente lite, was unnecessarily
gender-based and, therefore, unconstitutional under article I, section
3 of the Louisiana Constitution and under section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The First Circuit
80. 389 So. 2d 1307 (La. 1980).
81. 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court of Appeal reversed the award and held that article 148 uncon-
stitutionally discriminates on the basis of gender. Smith v. Smith,
382 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
The United States Supreme Court has not always employed a
uniform level of scrutiny in analyzing the constitutionality of state
statutes containing gender-based classifications. Before 1971,
gender-based classifications were upheld unless the legislation was
"patently arbitrary" and bore no rational relation to a legitimate
governmental interest.' In fact, the Supreme Court consistently
deferred to gender-based statutes that provided for the moral,
physical, and economic protection of women.2 Unfortunately, many of
these statutes either reinforced the stereotype of women in a depen-
dent role in the traditional family scheme or placed economic con-
straints on women under the veil of protection
For example, in 1908 in Muller v. Oregon' the United States
Supreme Court held constitutional a statute fixing a maximum
number of working hours for women. Three years earlier in Lochner
v. New York,5 the Court had invalidated a statute setting a max-
imum number of hours for bakers. Notably, the defendant in Muller
argued that Lochner was controlling, but the Court rejected the
argument. The Court's justification for its decision in Muller was
protection of the weaker sex.'
The Court's protective attitude continued for more than sixty
years after Muller. In 1948 in Goesart v. Cleary7 the constitutional-
ity of a Michigan law forbidding any female, except the wife or
daughter of a male properietor, from acting as a bartender was
upheld. Michigan's purported justification for the gender-based
discrimination was the desirable social objective of the moral protec-
tion of women. This decision, in effect, was a bar, under the guise of
protection, to the entry of females into an occupation. Inconsistently
with the alleged purpose of the Michigan law, women were permit-
ted to serve as waitresses in these same establishments.' The deci-
sion indicated that a gender-based statute would be validated if
1. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
2. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
3. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
4. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. 208 U.S. at 421-23.
7. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
8. Id at 467. The statute was to protect against "moral and social problems"
which may arise. But the decision was illogical, since it allowed women to work as
waitresses (without the husband's or father's being owner) where women could be ex-
posed to the same "hazards" faced by a female bartender.
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there were some minimal "basis in reason" for the statute,9 even
though the Court recognized that the real desire behind the statute
might be the "unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to
monopolize the calling."'"
In Hoyt v. Florida" in 1961, the Supreme Court upheld a Florida
statute which provided that no woman should be taken for jury ser-
vice unless she volunteered. The Court took the view that, as house-
wife, the "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life." 2
These cases show the length to which the Court would go to
validate gender-based legislation in furtherance of a policy of protec-
ting the female sex from the demands of the marketplace and from
moral turpitude. In fact, "the Supreme Court did not invalidate a
single statute on the ground of sex discrimination until 1971."'" In
that year a movement from the traditional rational relation require-
ment occurred in Reed v. Reed.' In Reed the Court began to in-
crease the level of scrutiny employed in reviewing gender-based
statutes. An Idaho statute giving preference to men over women in
the same entitlement class in appointments as administrators of es-
tates was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 5 In the words
of the Court, giving "a mandatory preference to members of either
sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause .. ..'"
Although the state purpose of administrative convenience could
have survived the rational relation test, the statute was not upheld.
In equal protection analysis of gender-based classifications, Reed
represented a dramatic shift to a higher level of scrutiny, but the
9. Id. at 466-67.
10. Id. at 467.
11. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
12. Id. at 62. This is consistent with the language of the Court some eighty-nine
years earlier. "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1873).
13. See Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis
of Kahn v. Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639, 645 (1979).
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. Id. For a discussion of the evolution of the intermediate scrutiny standard see
Hull, note 13 supra; Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451
(1978); Note, Alimony Awards Under Middle.Tier Equal Protection Scrutiny, 59 NEB.
L. REV. 172 (1980).
16. 404 U.S. at 76-77. The Court had modified its test to require that a state have
a substantial interest when legislating solely on the basis of gender.
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decision did not go so far as to make gender a "suspect" classifica-
tion, such as race," fundamental rights, 8 alienage, "9 or national
origin."°
In Frontiero v. Richardson' the Supreme Court continued to ex-
amine gender-based statutes with the higher scrutiny employed in
Reed. The Court invalidated a statute providing that spouses of
male members of the uniformed services be classified as dependents
(for purposes of allowances and medical and dental benefits), but re-
quiring female members to prove that they provided over one-half of
family support for their spouses to obtain the same dependency
status." As in Reed, administrative convenience was held insuffi-
cient to justify the gender-based classification. 3
The intermediate level of scrutiny introduced in Reed was more
clearly articulated in Craig v. Boren.' A statute permitting females
eighteen years of age and older to purchase 3.2% beer, while pro-
hibiting males from purchasing until age twenty-one, was held to
violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court identified two steps
in the new test. First, the legislation must serve an important
governmental objective; and, second, the classification must be
substantially related to the achievement of that objective. 5 In Craig,
although an important state interest existed, viz., the enhancement
of traffic safety,"6 the evidence produced was insufficient to prove
that the gender-based distinction achieved that objective. 7
Several cases have given substance to the term "important
governmental objective." In Kahn v. Shevin" the Court upheld a
17. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
20. Qyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
21. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
22. Id.
23. 411 U.S. at 690-91. "Thus in Reed, the objectives of 'reducing the workload on
probate courts' and 'avoiding intrafamily controversy' were deemed of insufficient im-
portance to sustain use of an overt gender criterion .... Decisions following Reed
similarly have rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important
objectives to justify gender based classifications." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98
(1976), quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
25. In articulating the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Craig Court stated:
"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." Id at 197.
26. Id. at 199.
27. Id at 200-04.
28. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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Florida statute providing a property tax exemption for widows but
not for widowers. The law was designed to cushion the financial im-
pact of spousal loss "upon the sex for which that loss imposes a
disproportionately heavy burden."' This gender-based discrimina-
tion was allowed in order to compensate women for their economic
disadvantage. In Schlesinger v. Ballard" gender-based discrimina-
tion was allowed to mitigate lack of opportunity. The Supreme
Court reviewed a Navy regulation which established lower stand-
ards for women for discharge resulting from lack of promotion. The
Court found that the regulation properly compensated for the lack
of opportunity that women faced. 1 In Califano v. Webster32 the
Court identified rectification of past economic discrimination as an
"important" purpose. In Califano the Court sanctioned a Social
Security Act provision which allowed women to calculate benefits on
a more favorable basis than men in order to compensate for
economic disabilities suffered by women.3 These cases illustrate the
type of state interest which the Supreme Court considers as a
governmental objective "important" enough to uphold a statute
which classifies solely on the basis of gender.
Since Craig, the appropriate standard of review for statutes con-
taining gender-based classifications has been intermediate scrutiny.
The challenged legislation, therefore, must bear a close and substan-
tial relationship to an important governmental objective.
The 1979 United States Supreme Court decision in Orr v. Orr"
illustrates the application of the intermediate scrutiny test to an
Alabama statute providing alimony to wives only. 5 The Supreme
Court noted three state interests which could be advanced as possi-
ble justification for the gender bias of the Alabama law. First, the
state may desire to allocate responsibility within the family by
establishing a dependent role for the wife. The Court did not
29. Id. at 355.
30. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
31. Id at 508. The Court found that "female line officers in the Navy are not
similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service." Id
32. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
33. Id at 317-20. "Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between men
and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women has been
recognized as such an important governmental objective." Id at 317.
34. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
35. In authorizing the imposition of alimony obligations on husbands but not
wives, the Alabama statutory scheme "'provides that different treatment be accorded
.. on the basis of ... sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause."' Id at 278-79, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75
(1971). "The fact that the classification expressly discriminates against men rather than
women does not protect it from scrutiny." 440 U.S. at 279.
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recognize the legitimacy of this interest and stated: "[T]he 'old no-
tion' that 'generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide
a home and its essentials' can no longer justify a statute that
discriminates on the basis of gender.""6
The second state objective recognized by the Court was the
desire that financial assistance be provided to needy spouses with
the assumption that the female will always be the needy spouse.
Although provision for needy spouses was an important state objec-
tive consistent with Kahn, Ballard, and Webster,37 a question
arose as to whether the gender-based classification was substantially
related to the achievement of that objective. 8 In Alabama a provi-
sion. for individual case hearings for the examination of the financial
circumstances of both spouses eliminated justification of the use of
sex as a proxy for need. 9 The provision in question in Orr was found
not to meet the objective of providing for the financial protection of
needy spouses, since no alimony benefits were provided to needy
males."
The Court also considered a third state objective-correction for
past discrimination. The relevant question was whether past
discrimination had left the woman "'not similarly situated with
respect to opportunities' in that sphere."41 This question was also
resolved by the provision for individual hearings. Financial aid could
be provided to the needy spouse unable to care financially for
himself or herself. A gender-neutral statute would provide for the
husband who was unable to support himself, as well as for the wife."
After Orr, when a state's compensatory and ameliorative purposes
can be served as well by a gender-neutral classification as by a
36. 440 U.S. at 279-80, quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975). "No
longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and
only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." Id at 14-15.
37. See- text at notes 28-33, supra.
38. Reed "has provided the underpinning for decisions that have invalidated
statutes employing gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of
classification." 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). Reed would require that the gender-based
categorization rest "'upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation .... ' 404 U.S. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
39. 440 U.S. at 281.
40. Id.
41. Id, quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
42. The Court noted that "[ljegislative classifications which distribute benefits and
burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about
the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection. Thus, even statutes
purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimina-
tion must be carefully tailored." Id at 283 (citation omitted).
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gender-based grouping, the state "cannot be permitted to classify on
the basis of sex.4 3
The wording of Louisiana's alimony provisions prior to 1979 was
similar to that of the Alabama statute examined in Orr. Civil Code
article 148 provided for alimony pendente lite. Before the 1979
amendments the article read:
If the wife has not a sufficient income for her maintenance pend-
ing the suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce,
the judge shall allow her, whether she appears as plaintiff or
defendant, a sum for her support, proportioned to her needs and
to the means of her husband."
In Louisiana, article 148, in conjunction with article 120, pro-
vides the statutory basis for alimony pendente lite.'5 The purpose of
article 148 is "the enforcement of the husband's obligation of sup-
port of his wife as it exists under Article 120 of the Civil Code,
which continues during the pendency of a suit for separation from
bed and board or for divorce. .". ."I Article 120 requires the husband
to provide his wife with whatever is needed for the "conveniences of
life," and article 148 is provided to enforce this obligation of sup-
port.
Before the Orr decision the Louisiana Supreme Court applied
the traditional rational relation test to alimony cases.'7 In the 1976
case of Williams v. Williams,'" the court held that the gender-based
wording of article 148 did not "discriminate arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably against males."' '9 The court reasoned that the
legislature enacted article 148 to compensate for the husband's con-
trol of the community as head and master." Similarly, the court had
43. Id.
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 148 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 72).
45. LA. CIv. CODE art. 120 states: "The wife is bound to live with her husband and
to follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and
to furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to
his means and condition."
46. McMath v. Masters, 198 So. 2d 734, 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), quoting Smith
v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 652, 47 So. 2d 32, 34 (1950). See Murphy v. Murphy, 229 La. 849,
87 So. 2d 4 (1956); Scott v. Scott, 174 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
47. See Comment, Alimony and Equal Protection: A Search for Rational Relation-
ships, 22 Loy. L. REV. 1036 (1976); Note, Alimony Pendente Lite: One-Way Street
Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 148, 22 Loy. L. REV. 1086 (1976).
48. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
49. Id. at 441.
50. Id. at 441. The alimony pendente lite provision would compensate for the fact
that in Louisiana the wife did not have control of the property; and the provision
would correct the fact that upon separation the wife did not have access to income
with which to support herself.
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upheld the gender-based reading of Louisiana's permanent alimony
provision. 1
The reasoning of the majority in Williams was subject to
criticism, since Louisiana courts "have consistently required
husbands to pay alimony pendente lite long after the community has
been partitioned and the wife is in complete control of her portion of
the community. '52 Accordingly, there was "no relationship between
the wife's right to claim alimony pendente lite and her inability to
control community funds."53 By 1979 the Williams decision was open
to challenge on additional grounds. The head and master rule had
been repealed because of its probable unconstitutionality in light of
the Orr decision.5 ' And, most importantly, the Louisiana Supreme
Court had decided to adopt the intermediate scrutiny standards
when considering statutes that classify solely on the basis of gender.
After the United States Supreme Court declared the Alabama
alimony statute unconstitutional," the Louisiana Supreme Court
followed by declaring unconstitutional article 160, Louisiana's per-manent alimony provision." This article, which provided alimony for
wives only, was declared unconstitutional as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.57 Article 160, as amended in 1979, contains no
gender bias. 8
51. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 72) stated:
"If the wife who has obtained the divorce has not sufficient means for her
maintenance, the Court may allow her in its discretion, out of the property and earn-
ings of her husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income .... The
Louisiana Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of article 160 in Loyacano v.
Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978). After Orr the case was remanded by the United
States Supreme Court to be considered in light of the Orr decision. See Loyacano v.
Loyacano, 375 So. 2d 1314 (La. 1979). See Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979)
(Louisiana Supreme Court found that this wording of article 160 was unconstitutional
before amended).
52. 331 So. 2d at 442.
53. Id.
54. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709. See Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex-Based Differentia-
tions in the Louisiana Community Property Regime, 19 Loy. L. REV. 373 (1973).
55. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
56. Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979). The Lovell decision "establishes a
new principle of law by overruling clear past precedent ... ." Id. at 422. This ruling
would have created a gap in the law, but had no practical effect in terms of absence of
a permanent alimony provision, since article 160 had been amended by Act 72 of 1979
to correct for gender bias. Thus, the revised article 160 became effective, filling the
gap in the law. The Lovell court stated that the decision would not be applied retroac-
tively. Id
57. Id. at 420-21.
58. LA. CiV. CODE art. 160 presently provides: "When a spouse has not been at
fault and has not sufficient means for support, the court may allow that spouse, out of
the property and earnings of the other spouse, alimony which shall not exceed one-
third of his or her income."
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In Smith v. Smith59 the constitutionality of article 148 was again
challenged. The Smith court, applying the intermediate scrutiny
test, declared article 148 unconstitutional and overruled Williams."0
The first circuit also considered the husband's obligation of support.
Until this decision article 120 was used to determine the level of
support due with respect to alimony pendente lite. The Smith deci-
sion broke with prior jurisprudence and instead applied article 119
as the basis of the husband's obligation to his wife."1 Article 119
establishes the obligation of each spouse to provide the other with
necessities, 2 whereas article 120 requires the husband alone to pro-
vide conveniences to his wife. 3 Clearly, the term "conveniences"
represents a higher level of support than "necessities."
The Smith court's decision to employ article 119's provision for
mutual support was consistent with the constitutional standard ap-
plicable under the intermediate scrutiny test. "Article 119 evidences
a legislative intent that . . . either spouse must come to the
assistance of the other, if the other is in need . ..."'
In Smith the first circuit recognized the constitutional dif-
ficulties with applying article 120 to males only. However, as other
circuits are free to apply article 120 to determine the male's obliga-
tion of support and article 119 to determine the female's obligation,
males could still be required to provide a higher level of support
than females. If other circuits continue to apply article 120 through
article 148, then the 1979 revision of article 148 will be meaningless,
because alimony pendente lite will remain gender-based.
The Smith decision makes it clear that the focal point of the
question of the constitutionality of alimony pendente lite in Loui-
59. 382 So. 2d 972 (1980).
60. 1& at 974. LA. CIv. CODE art. 148 presently reads: "If the spouse has not a suf-
ficient income for maintenance pending suit for separation from bed and board or for
divorce, the judge may allow the claimant spouse, whether plaintiff or defendant, a
sum for that spouse's support, proportioned to the needs of the claimant spouse and
the means of the other spouse." Interestingly, this constitutional challenge raised in
Smith came after the Louisiana Legislature had revised article 148, but before the
revision became effective. Thus the first circuit considered article 148 in its pre-
amendment form.
61. 382 So. 2d at 974. The court realized that a gap in the law was created by
holding article 148 unconstitutional, since there were no other specific provisions for
alimony pendente lite. However, the court referred to Civil Code article 21 as a
mechanism for filling this gap, because it allows the judge to decide according to
equity when there is no express Jaw. LA. CIv. CODE art. 21.
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 119 states: "The husband and wife owe to each other
mutually, fidelity, support and assistance." The court employed article 119 to deter-
mine the level of support due by the husband to his wife.
63. See note 45, supra.
64. 382 So. 2d at 974.
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siana rests on the constitutionality of article 120. To meet the re-
quirements of the intermediate scrutiny test, article 120 must serve
an important state interest, and the statute's gender bias must
relate substantially to that interest. The identifiable state interests
which could be advanced to support this gender-based classification
are identical to those presented in Orr: 1) to keep the female in a
dependent role, 2) to provide aid to the needy spouse with gender as
a proxy for needy, or 3) to compensate for past discrimination.
Regarding the first enumerated interest, the notion that
"'generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home
and its essentials'" can no longer justify a statute that discriminates
on the basis of gender. 5 Since 1971, the United States Supreme
Court consistently has rejected this objective as an "important"
state interest. Secondly, although women may be more likely to be
without "conveniences," so that article 120 would be providing for
the "needy spouse" in most cases, gender is an inappropriate proxy
for need." The financial circumstances of individuals can be con-
sidered in individual hearings without additional administrative
cost, eliminating any justification for gender as a proxy. Third, cor-
rection for past discrimination, if a spouse was not similarly situated
with respect to opportunities, can also be resolved by individual
hearings. Given that Louisiana provides for individual hearings, no
statutory necessity exists for requiring males to pay a higher level
of support than females pay. In a gender-neutral reading, alimony
can be awarded on the basis of actual necessity, whether the spouse
be a needy male or a needy female.
The Orr Court concluded that when a state's purposes are served
as well by a gender-neutral classification, the state will not be per-
mitted to classify on the basis of gender."1 "A gender-based
classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates
additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot
survive equal protection scrutiny." 8 Application of the rationale of
the Orr Court to Louisiana's alimony provisions suggests that arti-
cle 120 is unconstitutional in its gender-based requirement of a
higher obligation of support due by husbands.
Article 120 also can be constitutionally challenged on its
specification of a duty to follow. Article 120 requires that "the wife
is bound to live with her husband and to follow him wherever he
65. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1980), quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
10 (1975).
66. 440 U.S. at 281.




chooses to reside.""9 There is no reciprocal requirement for the male.
This element of article 120 is relevant in suits for separation from
bed and board. Should the wife leave and the husband refuse to
follow, the wife opens herself to a fault judgment on the ground of
abandonment. 0 The only apparent state interest is the desire to pro-
mote the traditional family, but the only person who has the burden
of maintaining the traditional family scheme is the woman; the arti-
cle allows the husband essentially total flexibility and control in
determining the family's domicile. Orr is expressly critical of this
type of gender-based provision.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Craig v. Craig" also
has implications for the constitutionality of article 120. The Craig
court held article 39 unconstitutional" as it applies to the venue re-
quirements of Code of Civil Procedure article 3941," because it ar-
bitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably discriminates on the basis
of sex75 insofar as article 39 enables the husband but not the wife to
establish a separate domicile. The effect of Craig is to give the wife
the right to leave the matrimonial domicile in order to get a separa-
tion or divorce. Prior to Craig, in cases in which the husband was
not at fault, the wife could not establish a separate domicile apart
from her husband in order to bring an action for separation from
bed and board. The wife's domicile was considered to be the same as
her husband's even when the wife chose an independent household.
Thus article 39, prior to Craig, reflected the notion of a gender-
based duty to follow. By declaring article 39 unconstitutional, the
court recognized the difficulty of requiring a gender-based duty to
69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 120. See note 45, 8upra.
70. In Louisiana, the wife is presently allowed to leave the matrimonial domicile
without being subject to a fault judgment under Louisiana Civil Code article 138(5) in
cases where slte has "lawful cause." "Lawful cause" has been interpreted to be broader
than requiring the wife to have grounds to seek a fault judgment for separation under
article 138 or divorce under article 139. Sykes v. Sykes, 321 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975). Of course, the wife could not obtain a judgment for separation or divorce
unless she proves fault under article 138 or 139 or she meets the requirements of R.S.
9:301.
71. 440 U.S. at 280.
72. 365 So. 2d 1298 (La. 1978).
73. LA. CIv. CODE art. 39 states: "A married woman has no other domicile than
that of her husband; the domicile of a minor not emancipated is that of his father,
mother, or tutor; a person of full age, under interdiction, has his domicile with his
curator."
74. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3941 states: "An action for an annulment of marriage, for
a separation from bed and board, or for a divorce shall be brought in a parish where
either party is domiciled, or in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile."
75. 365 So. 2d at 1300-01.
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follow in cases where the wife seeks a separation from the husband
who is not at fault.
76
Thus article 120 can be challenged constitutionally on two
grounds: first, Louisiana's provision for individual case hearings for
examining the financial circumstances of the spouses eliminates any
need to have a generalized statute which requires a higher level of
support from husbands. No substantial relation to the "important"
objective of providing for the needy spouse exists by utilizing this
procedure in the alimony context. Second, by requiring that wives
alone have a duty to follow, article 120 establishes a gender-based
classification with no apparent "important" state interest to justify
this differential treatment.
Louisiana's alimony pendente lite provision can be reconciled in
any one of three ways. First, Louisiana courts could declare article
120 unconstitutional and follow the Smith court in applying article
119 to determine the support due by one spouse or the other
without regard to gender. Second, the courts could rule that the
revisions to article 148 impliedly amend article 120 to define a level
of support due by both spouses. However, this approach would be
contrary to the express wording" of the article and would not
76. 365 So. 2d at 1298. In Craig, article 39 was held unconstitutional "insofar as it
enables the husband, but not the wife, to establish a separate domicile and there bring
an action for ... separation ... or divorce." Id at 1301. The court clearly restricted its
decision, such that article 39 was only unconstitutional as it applied to article 3941 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1301 n.6. Despite this restriction, the decision nar-
rows the duty to follow to a degree. Admittedly most of the legislative notion is intact
after Craig, but the decision marks an erosion of the doctrine and may presage full
judicial disapproval of the gender-based duty to follow.
77. In considering gender-based statutes, two judicial approaches are available to
correct the constitutional difficulties raised in equal protection analysis. Equal protec-
tion requires that there be no discrimination. "Nothing in the constitution compels one
result over the other." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 39 LA. L. REv. 807, 810 (1979) (emphasis added).
Discrimination may be removed by extending the statute to the excluded gender or by
invalidating the statute, leaving a gap in the law.
Extending the statute to the excluded class would be consistent with the legislative
intent of providing alimony to the needy spouse. Refusal to amend impliedly the
gender-based article is "more disrespectful to the legislature" than refusal to apply the
statute. Id at 811. Further, most of the cases before the United States Supreme Court
have extended the benefit to the deprived class rather than invalidate the statute. Id.
The Civil Code contains articles on interpretation that would support invalidation
of gender-based statutes that are found unconstitutional. Louisiana Civil Code article
13 declares that when a law "is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not
to be disregarded .... The wording of article 120 is clear. The husband is to provide
conveniences to his wife. No reciprocal wording exists in article 120. Moreover, accord-
ing to Civil Code article 23, when new laws contain "provisions contrary to or irrecon-
cilable with those of the former law," then the former law is impliedly repealed. Thus,
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resolve the problem of requiring the wife to "follow" the husband;
and enforcement of this requirement on a non-gender basis ap-
plicable to both parties would create the absurdity of each spouse's
having to follow the other."8 Moreover, the legislature has not revised
the statute. By holding that an implied amending has occurred
through the enactment of article 148, the court would circumvent
the legislative function."9 The third alternative is for the legislature
to amend article 120 should the legislators determine that "conven-
iences," rather than "necessities," be provided during separation.
The wording could require either spouse to provide to the other
whatever is required for the conveniences of life in proportion to his
or her means and condition. With respect to the "duty to follow,"
the article could be revised to require each spouse to receive the
other without any duty to follow.
The Smith court declared Louisiana's gender-based alimony pro-
vision unconstitutional. Breaking with prior jurisprudence, the first
circuit applied article 119 rather than article 120 to determine the
duty of support owed by a spouse for purposes of alimony pendente
lite. The reciprocal obligation owed by the spouses in article 119 is
constitutionally sound in light of the Orr decision. By contrast, the
constitutionality of article 120 is open to question. The application of
article 120 through article 148 weakens the structure of Louisiana's
alimony provisions, and the application of article 120 to fault
judgments conflicts potentially with Louisiana's provision for
separation from bed and board on the ground of abandonment.
Other Louisiana courts should follow the first circuit and apply arti-
cle 119 to provide alimony pendente lite until the question of the
constitutionality of article 120 is resolved. Further legislative revi-
sion or judicial action will be required to establish sexual equality in
Louisiana's alimony scheme.
Bernard Joseph Sharkey
if the contrary part of article 120 is impliedly repealed, then it cannot become broader
to be more inclusive than was originally contemplated by the legislature. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 23.
78. Here the husband could move to one town, requiring the wife to follow. Had
the wife not wanted originally to move, she could then move back, requiring the hus-
band to follow, and so on, ad absurdum.
79. In Loyacano, Justice Calogero stated: "I would not usurp the legislative func-
tion by grafting onto our law a constitutionally permissible alimony provision. I believe
that function should and will be performed by the legislature." Loyacano v. Loyacano,
358 So. 2d at 317 (La. 1978) (Calogero, J., dissenting). In his dissent Justice Calogero
was addressing the constitutionality of article 160 before its revision.
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